Details on Possible Pirate Attacks
March 22 – Gulf of Aden
Because of a lack of space in the April
issue of Latitude
38, we won’t be able to publish Don and Katie Radcliffe’s
account of what they believe were attempted pirate attacks on
their Santa Cruz-based Klondike while in the Gulf of Aden.
So we’re publishing their entire report here:
“The Gulf of Aden between Somalia
and Yemen has had numerous acts of piracy against yachts in recent
years, and 2004 has been no exception. The primary months for
yachts to traverse the Gulf are January through March, the monsoon
season, and so far there have been two successful attacks on
yachts and three reported instances in which yachts were chased.
“We’ve just transited the Gulf of
Aden, and had several experiences ourselves. The first incident
started at 8 p.m. local time on February 23 at 13°50’N, 50°05’E.
It was about an hour after sunset and an hour before moonset.
We were traveling with only a small white light to avoid being
seen, when we saw a single white light slightly off our starboard
bow that the radar indicated was a small vessel about two miles
out. We turned 40 degrees to port, at which time the other vessel
changed course to intercept us. As the other vessel closed to
50 meters of our starboard quarter, we could see that it was
a 30-35 foot diesel-powered boat, perhaps a ship’s lifeboat,
with several men on the bow. The diesel smoke pouring from their
exhaust made it obvious they were trying to catch us. Fortunately,
we turned on our diesel and were able to accelerate away. We
broadcast a Mayday on VHF 16 as we pulled away, giving our position
and the situation.
“Our Mayday was answered by a yacht
12 miles astern, and we advised them again of our situation and
position. We again extinguished all lights and varied our course.
After about five minutes, the other vessel broke off their chase.
The ultimate intention of the other vessel remains unclear, as
we were able to keep them from coming within 50 yards, but it
clearly looked as though they were preparing to board us. No
weapons were seen or heard.
“Our second incident took place at
about 11 p.m. local time on the same night, at 13°39’N, 49°49′
E. While traveling without lights, we noticed a single white
light on our port beam that the radar indicated was about five
miles from us. Since it appeared to be trying to intercept us,
we changed course by 50 degrees and began motorsailing. They
continued to converge on us at about eight knots.
“After about 20 minutes, the other
vessel had gotten to within four miles astern, so we changed
course again and accelerated to our maximum speed of 7.5 knots.
After 20 minutes, we repeatedly hailed the vessel on 16, informing
it that if it continued to follow us, we would broadcast a Mayday.
But we got no response.
“When it closed to within three miles,
we broadcast a Mayday and our position on both VHF and SSB. The
only stations that responded were a group of four yachts some
12 to 15 miles ahead of us. We requested that Solara,
one of the yachts, use their Satphone to call the authorities.
They called the Australian Marine Safety Authority (61 2 6230
6811), who told him that they would report the situation to the
Piracy Control Center in Kuala Lumpur (60 3 2031 0014), and told
him to call back in 30 minutes. We fired two parachute flares
during this time, which were reportedly seen by the group of
following yachts.
“After 20 minutes, the pursuing vessel
was within two miles and had swung directly behind us. We altered
course dramatically once again, changing the wind angle, allowing
us to reach along at 8.5 knots. The other vessel turned out her
lights, making her more difficult to track, but then seemed to
slowly fall back. After another 30 minutes, we changed course
into the waves, hoping to discourage the other boat from following
us. The other boat didn’t follow this change in course, and disappeared
from the radar screen after 20 minutes. We told the yachts following
our situation on VHF to report to the authorities that we were
no longer being pursued, and eventually joined up with them.
We had no more incidents that night.
“The second vessel had never gotten
close enough for a visual description, but it was clearly more
sophisticated than the first, with a speed of perhaps 10 knots,
and probably a VHF and radar. It had no problem tracking our
radical course changes at a distance of 3-5 miles on a night
with no moon. We believe that the combination of the flares,
the VHF traffic with the other boats, and their only small speed
advantage discouraged them from chasing us for longer than an
hour.
“The following morning we were contacted
by a helicopter from the Coalition naval forces, which had been
alerted by Kuala Lumpur. That afternoon we were visited by a
Spanish warship. A boarding party came aboard to verify that
we were not being held hostage, and took details of the incidents.
The Spanish warship provided a loose escort for our group until
we neared Aden. Words cannot express how grateful we were for
the escort, as it was provided in the region where numerous yachts
have been attacked in recent years. We had made arrangements
to convoy through this dangerous area, but our problems had occurred
about 80 miles east of the historical attacks.
“Was the first boat manned by innocent
and curious fishermen? Was the second vessel unable to understand
English and trying to come to our aid after we set off the flares?
Did we overreact? We’ll never know for sure, but when a boat
tries to intercept your boat at night in lonely waters 60 miles
offshore in the Gulf of Aden, we believe it’s most prudent to
assume the worst. Our fears were confirmed by reports of successful
attacks on yachts in the following days.
“The first reported attack was on
the French yacht Le Notre Dame, which was boarded and
robbed by armed fishermen/pirates on February 27 at 13°30’N,
47°51E. The yacht was approached at 1 p.m. local time about
30 miles off the coast of Yemen by a small fishing boat with
five men aboard. The men were armed with knives and automatic
rifles, and took cameras, binoculars, alcohol, and other easily
accessible valuables. The crew was shaken but unharmed, and proceeded
to Aden. In this instance, a Coalition warship heard the relayed
distress message on VHF, asked commercial shipping to assist,
and responded with a helicopter some six hours later.
“The second attack was on March 5,
when the American singlehander on Salt Air was boarded
at 13°13’N, 48°33’E – or some 50 miles southeast of the
attack on Notre Dame. He was approached at 6 p.m. local
time by a 50-ft boat, whose crew fired three shots in the air
from about 75 yards away as a warning to stop. Three men came
aboard Salt Air. One man held the American skipper at
gunpoint while the others took his VHF and HF radios, plus cameras
and $20 in a ‘decoy’ wallet. The men left with smiles and goodbye
waves – and fired another shot into the air. The pirate boat
was black with yellow trim and had orange plastic tarps on the
bow. It was loaded with people, mostly women, and was likely
smuggling Somalis into Yemen. The American skipper had been unable
to issue a Mayday before his radios were taken, so there was
no response from the authorities.
“Another suspicious incident took
place on March 7, when the yacht Silver Girl was chased
for 20 minutes by a 50-ft fishing boat at 14°26’N, 52°E,
at 4 p.m. This boat had a high bow and cabin – typical of the
fishing boats in the area. Silver Girl is a big boat and
was capable of 10 knots, so they outran the other boat, and issued
a Pan call on the VHF.
The Gulf of Aden is regularly patrolled
by Coalition warships, helicopters, and planes, whose primary
mission – other than a military show of force – is to monitor
commercial shipping. When we are in range of one of the warships,
we hear them 24 hours a day calling other vessels in the following
manner: “Vessel at 13°32’N, 48°12′ E, traveling
242° at 17.8 knots, this is the Coalition warship 12 miles
from your starboard bow.” They keep this up until someone
on the ship gets the captain out of bed, and he gets to answer
questions about the ship’s name, tonnage, registration, ports
of call, cargo, and so forth. At the lower levels, the Coalition
navy would be happy to provide protection to yachts and do something
about the piracy, as it is much more rewarding than harassing
ships. At the command level, the yachts have not been put on
their political agenda, and they are not ready to risk aggravating
the local authorities by interdicting the pirate boats. We sent
an email to the coalition via the Kuala Lumpur Piracy Center
asking them to open better communication lines to the yachts.
Their response is that we should call on the VHF when we had
an emergency.
“The local authority is the Yemeni
Coast Guard, which is rumored to be funded and trained by the
United States. The Coalition warship that aided us suggested
I file an incident report in Yemen, so I went to the Coast Guard
office in Aden with a written report. The pistol-packing, qat-chewing
commandant (qat is the local narcotic leaf) couldn’t speak much
English, so he sat me down with an interpreter. The interpreter
was a local shipping agent who read the report and said that
if these boats could have caught us, they would have robbed us.
He reported my story to the commandant, who replied that these
pirates were Somali, not Yemeni, and they would keep them away
from us.
“Since all of the incidents reported
above took place at least 30 miles offshore, the next group of
six yachts tried to run close to shore. On March 7, the group
was intercepted seven miles off the coast by big Yemeni Coast
Guard inflatables, who tried to force them to the nearest port
so their boats could be ‘searched’. After a half hour of yelling
and VHF calls to the Coalition – which the Coast Guard tried
to jam – the Coast Guard boss received a cell phone call from
someone in higher authority, and the yachts were turned loose.
After their experience with Yemeni ‘protection’, these boats
headed offshore for the rest of the trip. Yemen is a very conservative
Muslim country, and there are many people there who have been
told to hate Westerners – especially after what they view as
Western aggression against Muslim Arab countries.
“The basic problem is that every boat
fishing and/or smuggling off the Yemeni coast is learning that
yachts are unarmed, full of cash and valuables, and there will
be no intervention by the authorities. The convoys have been
successful, as the pirates prefer to attack single boats. The
attackers are not interested in harming the yachties, although
an Australian woman was shot in the leg in 2001 when the pirates
fired at her catamaran. The attacks will probably increase in
frequency until an armed yacht fights back or the Coalition gets
told to protect the yachts.”
|
